PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE AGE OF MARKMAN AND MANTRAS

to achieve uniformity and certainty in the context of de novo review, he suggests a proposal to encourage the Federal Circuit to accept interlocutory appeals of district court claim interpretations or so-called Markman hearings. According to the proposal, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, would promulgate a rule specifically permitting or requiring the Federal Circuit to hear an interlocutory appeal of a claim inte1pretation decision. Professor Nard argues that the Federal Circuit, which has a special duty to promote uniformity and certainty, cannot have it both ways; that is, the court cannot employ a de novo standard of review on the one hand and, on the other hand, refuse to entertain interlocutory appeals. Furthermore, acceptance of interlocutory appeals would foster early certainty and promote settlement negotiations. Consistent with this proposal, he also recommends that a district court, when applicable, apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to its sister courts' claim interpretation decisions. The application of issue preclusion would promote uniformity at the district court level, and coupled with interlocutory review, would promote early certainty.
Uniformity and certainty are modem patent law mantras particularly as they apply to approaches to claim interpretation and to ultimate claim meaning. Although the virtues of uniformity and certainty were always appreciated in patent law, they have only achieved mantra status in the wake of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 1 In Markman, the en bane majority of Federal Circuit judges characterized the issue of claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de novo review. 2 In so doing, the court positioned itself as the arbiter of claim meaning and, therefore, the overseer of patent infringement proceedings. 3 The only issue that was thought to be on the table, in what is now known as Markman I, was who should be responsible for interpreting claim language: judge or jury. In holding that claim interpretation was solely for the court, the Federal Circuit majority, based largely on functional considerations, eloquently justified its decision. The heart of the court's reasoning was that eliminating the jury from claim interpretation would promote uniformity and certainty in patent law. Fair enough; but does this attractive prospect require the court to label claim interpretation a question of law with a concomitant de novo standard of review?
In a previous work, I expressed my skepticism of the Markman I decision and its progeny. 4 Specifically, I argued that de novo review and the virtual exclusion of extrinsic evidence in determining claim meaning is inconsistent with legal and hermeneutic philosophy, ignores the centrality of patent law's person of ordinary skill in the art and the district court's institutional superiority, and, ultimately, poses a unsettling risk to post-innovation practices such as improvement theory and design-around theory. 5 In this essay, however, I challenge Markman I on its own terms. I argue that if the Federal Circuit persists in viewing claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de novo review, it should take heed of certain process considerations so as to facilitate the realization of early certainty and uniformity in patent law because currently, these important policy concerns are as elusive as they were prior to Markman I, if not more so. (1999) ("Although, according to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, predictability, and certainty in patent litigation, many believe that the holding has had the opposite effect. This is largely because Federal Circuit review of claim interpretation is de novo.").
Thus, I propose that the court should be more receptive to adjudicating interlocutory orders arising from Marlanan hearings. 7 In this regard, I set forth two proposals that would either entice or require the Federal Circuit to grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpretation. To realize early certainty, the Federal Circuit must make a Cfhoice-either afford district court claim interpretations more deference or grant interlocutory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation. 8 The Federal Circuit cannot have it both ways; the court may not exercise de novo review while refusing to hear interlocutory appeals. Furthermore, I urge the Federal Circuit to endorse and facilitate the district court's appropriate application of issue preclusion in the context of claim interpretation. When applicable, the doctrine of issue preclusion will have a unifying effect on claim meaning· consistent with the vision of Markman I.
Part I discusses Markman I and its progeny, as well as the present desire of certain Federal Circuit judges to remake, if not drastically limit, Markman I. Part II.A addresses the issue of interlocutory appeals in the context of Markman hearings and proposes that the Supreme Court exercise its authority pursuant to the Rules Enabling Ad to promulgate a rule specifically making Markman orders appealable as a matter of discretion or, in the alternative, appealable as of right. Finally, part II.B discusses the doctrine of issue preclusion and its role in fostering uniformity at the district court level.
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I. THE MARKMAN DECISION, ITS PROGENY, AND THE BURGEONING APOSTASY
A. Markman I: Blinding the Artisan
Many Federal Circuit judges in recent years have understandably expressed their frustration with inept or purposively vague claim drafting/ 0 the uncertainties that accompany the equitable doctrine of equivalents,n and the vicissitudes of the jury in patent casesY Similar to the atmosphere of the late nineteenth century, 13 this frustration has prompted some judges 10 . E.g., ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting) (referring to claim drafting, Judge Nichols wrote " [w] e are up against what we must realistically consider a growing inability of speakers and writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say with accuracy and clarity").
11. E.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Lourie, J.). As Judge Lourie noted:
ld Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent.
12. E.g., Judge Paul R. Michel, Improving Patent Jury Trials, in PLI's FOURTH ANNuAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY LAW 1998, at 81 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 532, 1998) ("The very unpredictability of jury verdicts not only undermines opinion letters, but discourages license agreements and design-arounds, and multiplies litigation -with attendant costs in money, disruption and delay.").
13. In the early nineteenth century there was no statutory requirement to claim an invention. The Patent Act of 1793 simply required the applicant to "distinguish [his invention] from all other things before known." Patent Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836). Despite the lack of a statutory claim requirement, applicants began to include claim-type language in their patents. These inchoate claims were eventually used with greater frequency. Applicants would engage in what was known as central claim drafting, whereby an applicant would describe his invention in a claim and thereafter include the phrase "as substantially as described herein" or some variation thereof. During litigation, the court would peruse the written description and the drawings to determine the "principle that formed the inventive idea or solution underlying the claim language." Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hitlon Davis· A Comparative Law Analysis, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 479, 502 (1996) . This practice was so common that when the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1856), was passed, it was "understood as merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the courts." Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc' Y 134, 143 (1938) . The word "claim" found its way into the 1836 Patent Act and, as a result, assumed greater importance. Nevertheless, the claim was still not regarded as the central feature of the patent document, even though applicants began to draft claims more specifically by expending a "great deal of effort ... in formulating claims, and the practice grew of presenting a profusion of claims of varying form and scope." William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REv. 755, 764 (1948) . As the emphasis on claims grew, however, so did the ease with which a competitor could circumvent claims by making minor modifications to his product, thus avoiding literal infringement. The Supreme Court responded to this practice in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), wherein the Court held that a device may infringe a patent claim despite the fact that the claim did not literally read on the device. See id at 342-43. Thus, the Court looked beyond the four corners of the patent claim and established what became known as the doctrine of equivalents. Many viewed Winans and its progeny as a threat to the notice function of the patent claim, and in 1870, Congress, for the first time, specifically required the patent applicant to claim his invention distinctly and with particularity. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 116 Stat. 198, 201 (1871 ) . This new requirement, which came to be known as peripheral claiming, was designed to "accommodate the notice function of claims." Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (1997). It did this by increasing the reliability of "claims by the public by limiting the bounds of the patent to that covered by the claims and a narrow range of equivalents." !d. at 14. Central claiming was officially dead, and much to reemphasize the importance of certainty and uniformity in patent law, and one way to establish these virtues is to champion the notice function of the patent claim.
14 Section 112 of title 35 requires the patentee to "particularly" point out and "distinctly" claim what he "regards as his invention;" 15 therefore, competitors of the patentee should be able to discern the boundaries of the patentee's proprietary interest without lifting their eyes from the patent's text. 16 This "movement" ineluctably led to the elimination of the jury from the issue of claim interpretation, which, it should be noted, is generally regarded as a positive development by the patent barP Reducing the jury's like the hypertextualist's atmosphere today, the patent claim in 1870 held center stage. E.g., Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (asserting that the claim is of "primary importance" in ascertaining exactly what is patented).
14. 16. E.g., Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573-74 ("It seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he claims a patent."); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ( Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the order declining the suggestion for rehearing in bane); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that the function of claims is "putting competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed invention"). In Litton Systems, Inc., Judge Gajarsa stated:
Public notice of the scope of the right to exclude, as provided by the patent claims, specification and prosecution history, is a critical function of the entire scheme of patent law. The notice function is critical because it provides competitors with the necessary information upon which they can rely to shape their behavior in the marketplace. 145 F.3d at 1474 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the Order declining the suggestion for rehearing in bane).
17 role in patent litigation, however, was only the first step. The court took an additional step and characterized claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de novo review. Thus, the decision rendered the patent's text the principal and, for all practical purposes, the sole interpretive tool-a tool that, according to some Federal Circuit judges, is "rarely ambiguous." As such, in the name of certainty and uniformity, the respective roles of the trial judge and the expert witness have been greatly marginalized, while the influence of the Federal Circuit, in tum, has been significantly augmented.
The importance of the notice function of the patent claim has always been appreciated or, at least, understood by judges on the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, 20. There were also constitutional issues pertaining to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury that are beyond the scope of this article and not particularly germane to my thesis.
21. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (asserting that a patent is a written instrument and "[i]t has long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American patent law that 'construction of a written evidence is exclusively with a court"').
22. See id. ("When a court construes the claims of the patent, it 'is as if the construction fixed by the court had been incorporated in the specification,' and in this way the court is defining the federal legal rights created by the patent document." (citation omitted)).
23. See id. at 978-79. It is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude. They may understand what the scope of the patent owner's rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution history-"the undisputed public and should have ended there, but, perhaps inclined to establish itself as the arbiter of claim meaning and to enhance its power to oversee patent infringement disputes, the court went on to find that claim interpretation was a question of law subject to de novo review: 25 We ... hold that in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim. . . . Because claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeaU 6 It is important to point out that the court did not have to reach or create the law/fact issue to find that a judge is better able than a jury to interpret claims.
27 The court could very easily have justified its decision on the functional or institutional considerations that it so capably articulated.
Moreover, by addressing the law/fact issue, the court painted itself into a corner with respect to the issue of extrinsic evidence because the court was now faced with the prospect of reconciling the use of factually intensive expert testimony by district court judges with its holding that claim interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. The court finessed this issue by focusing on the informational aspects of expert testimony. According to the court, because a district court judge may not be technologically savvy, "[ e ]xtrinsic evidence ... may be necessary to inform the court about the language in which the patent is written."
28 Notably, the court went on to admonish that "this evidence is not for the purpose of clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology;" 29 in fact, "[i]t is not ambiguity in the document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather unfamiliarity of the comi with the terminology of the art to which the patent is record" -and applying established rules of construction to the language of the patent claim in the context of the patent. Moreover, competitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement litigation occurs, that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights to be given legal effect.
I d. (citations omitted).
24. See id. at 979 ("To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of fact, to be inquired of and determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of the opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his rights under the patent." (citing PROFESSOR W!LUAM C. ROBINSON 32 On the one hand, the artisan can be used only as an "educational tool"; yet, on the other hand, the court is to discern what the artisan "would have understood" the claim language to mean.
The majority's conflicting language was highlighted by Judge Newman in a lengthy dissent wherein she characterized the majority opinion as "unworkable, and ultimately unjust.'m For Judge Newman, the role of the expert is indispensable in interpreting claims because "[p ]a tents are technologic disclosures, written by and for the technologically experienced: those 'of skill in the art."' 34 By adopting a de novo standard, the majority denies that the meaning and scope of disputed technical terms "are classical questions of fact" that are most efficiently and effectively discovered at the trial leveP 5 The ideological lines were drawn in Markman I. Subsequent cases provided those judges who disagreed with Markman I an opportunity to elaborate upon their position. Inventors' usages of words to describe their inventions, and the meaning thereby conveyed to persons skilled in the field, are questions of fact, not matters of law, in patent documents as in other written instruments. Disputes concerning the meaning and usage of technical terms and words arise in many areas of law. These disputes are resolved by the triers of fact, whether judge or jury, in their established roles in the adjudicatory process. In Hoechst, the claimed invention related to a method for reducing iodide contamination in an organic medium by the addition of a macroreticulated silver-charged cation exchange resin. See id. at 1577. The claim stated that the resin must be "stable in the organic medium" I d. at 1578. In the written description, "stable" was defined as that which would not break down or '"change more than about 50 percent of its dry physical dimension."' Id. at 1578-79 (emphasis added}. The parties could not agree on the meaning of the word "dimension." Although the court ultimately relied on the written description to resolve the dispute, Judge Newman was clearly receptive to the extrinsic evidence that was introduced during the trial:
The parties have provided us with photographs and experimental data, the testimony of the scientists who produced the data and interpreted it, and the testimony of experts in the field.
Markman [I]
limits appellate reliance on extrinsic evidence to evidence in explanation of the technology and technical terms .... However, we have found it necessary to rely on the evidence presented at the trial and credit certain evidence over other evidence, for we are not personally qualified to know the scientific meanings of "stable" and "dimension" as applied to macroreticulated cation-exchange resins in organic medium.
prompting the Supreme Court to review Markman I in a decision known as Markman I/.
B. Markman II: De Novo Review Called into Question
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that claim interpretation is solely for the judge. The Court, like the Federal Circuit, based its decision on "functional considerations" such as uniformity and the judge's "training in exegesis." 38 Two additional and related points, however, must be made about Marknwn II. The first relates to the relationship between expert testimony and claim interpretation; and the second concerns the proper standard of review. We will see that the Supreme Court's treatment, or lack thereof, of these two issues provided both an affirmation of the Markman I majority position and an impetus for the dissenters to push-on.
"Internal Coherence" and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence
In holding that claim interpretation was solely an issue for the judge, the Court addressed the role of the jury in making credibility determinations.39 The Supreme Court stated that "any credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document." 40 Thus, while recognizing the value of expert testimony, the Court emphasized the primacy of the patent's text as an interpretive tool. According to the Court, "[t]he decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent's internal coherence." 41 The typical credibility determinations that a jury makes "are much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent." 42 The Markman I majority has understood the Court's subsumption of credibility determinations "within the whole document" and emphasis on the preservation of the "patent's internal coherence" to mean that the intrinsic record.enjoys a certain interpretive primacy and, while expert testimony may be helpful, it cannot contradict the unambiguous text of the patent. 43 44 wherein the court provided district court judges and the patent bar with an interpretive, if not mechanical, road map that, when read properly, would rarely lead to the use of expert testimony. The court stated that "where the public record [i.e., claims, specification, and prosecution history] unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper." 45 The rationale is that "competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established mles of claim constmction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed invention. " 
Claim Interpretation as a "Mongrel Practice"
The second point relating to the Supreme Court's Marlanan II decision concerns the proper standard of review for claim interpretation. Although the Court did not directly address this issue, it stated, in what 1 proved to be controversial dicta, that the issue of claim interpretation is a "mongrel practice" that '"falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact. "' 47 This language breathed new life into the Markman I dissenters, who, sensing an opening, conflated the issues of expert testimony and standard of review. These judges, using the Markman I majority's own terms, eagerly seized upon Justice Souter's law/fact language to assert that claim interpretation involved significant factual determinations centering around the use of expert testimony. Because claim interpretation was not a pure question of law, the Marlanan I dissenters argued that de novo review, while acceptable for the ultimate legal conclusion on claim scope, was not the sole standard of review; rather, the court should review the factual findings more deferentially. This argument allowed the dissenters to advance what they considered to be a central precept of claim interpretation: extrinsic evidence plays a fundamental role in claim constmction.
C. De Novo Review Solidified in the Wake ofMarkman II
In the wake of Markman II, the Markman I majority continued to emphasize the primacy of the intrinsic record and the de novo standard of 44 review. 48 AJthough they opined that extrinsic evidence may be used as an interpretive tool in the face of ambiguity, the Markman I majority would nearly always find that the intrinsic record was clear on its face. 49 In contrast, the Markman I dissenters were persistent in stressing not only the importance of the intrinsic record but also the necessity of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation. As a normative matter for the dissenters, a threshold finding of textual ambiguity is not necessary, or even possible, before considering extrinsic evidence. Therefore, like Arthur Corbin in the context of contractual interpretation 50 or his student, Karl Llewellyn, 51 the dissenters would always admit extrinsic evidence when construing claim 1an-guage. 
I d.
[W]here the Restatement admits extrinsic evidence only in the case of an ambiguity in the contract itself, Corbin would have required no such prima facie ambiguity. He insisted rather that ambiguity is itself a product of extrinsic evidence, and so would have allowed extrinsic evidence at all times so long as it was for the purpose of interpretation and not contradiction. 
Llewellyn, in particular, successfully advocated the enforcement of contracts with a minimum number of agreed-upon terms, at the same time that he and others were liberalizing the parol evidence rule to facilitate the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that the parties actually had a "meeting of the minds" on the relevant issue.
52. E.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) (Newman, J.. joined by Mayer, J., additional views).
Of course the primary source of information concerning the claimed invention is the patent documents. But such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional evidence and expert testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the exception. Socalled 'extrinsic' evidence ... should be treated like any other evidence, and received and given weight and value as appropriate. ld. at 1481 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, J., additional views); e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., joined by Mayer, J.) (stating that "the testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at the time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant evidence"); see also Furthermore, the Markman I dissenters asserted that the characterization of claim interpretation as a question of law was artificial, and, if forced to affix a label, claim interpretation, if anything, was a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, they pushed for a bifurcated standard of review, whereby the district court's factual findings would be reviewed deferentially and the ultimate decision on claim scope would be subject to de novo review. Needless to say, the Markman I majority, to put it mildly, resisted this line of reasoning and an ideological struggle ensued. In the end, the Federal Circuit had no choice but to address en bane the issue of extrinsic evidence and the proper allocation of interpretive authority.
In The majority in Cybor insisted that "[n]othing" in Markman II "supports the view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option-that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.'' 57 Indeed, Markman II understood the importance of the Federal Circuit's role in "providing national uniformity to the construction of a patent claim." 58 Moreover, according to the Cybor majority, the Supreme Court's silence on the standard of review was in fact an implicit affirmation of Markman I's holding that claim interpretation is subject to de novo review: "Accordingly, we today disavow any language in previous opinions of this court that holds, purports to hold, states, or suggests anything to the contrary, see, e.g., Fromson, ... Eastman Kodak, ... Metaullics .... " 59 Judges Plager and Bryson each wrote a concurring opinion. Both opinions, although endorsing a de novo standard of review, shied away from the law/fact distinction and adopted more of a process approach. Judge Plager wrote:
On appeal, this court has the benefit of the trial judge's considered view, and the record of the effort n;tade at trial to assist the Judges Plager and Bryson appear to be uncomfortable with the characterization of claim construction as one of law. 62 Although they both embrace de novo review, they would employ an mstitutional competence analysis depending upon the nature of the evidence considered by the district court. 63 These concurrences are important because they try to reconcile de novo review with the institutional superiority of the district court judge as to underlying factual determinations. Indeed, when one looks closely enough, they do not diverge significantly from the position of the Markman I dissenters.
In three separate opinions, the Markman I dissenters, as expected, took a more pronounced position against the majority. Judge Mayer concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion that was joined by Judge Newman. 64 Judge Rader dissented-in-part, joined-in-part, and concurred in the judgment, 65 and Judge Newman filed "additional views" with which Judge Mayer joined.
66
In his opinion, Judge Mayer criticized the majority for "profoundly misapprehend [ 68. See id. at 1464 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Though it could have done so easily, the Court chose not to accept our formulation of claim construction: as a pure question of law to be decided de novo in all cases on appeal.").
of the jury in claim construction. 69 The Supreme Court, in holding that claim construction was solely for the judge, said nothing about the proper standard of review.
70 Therefore, for Judge Mayer, it is incorrect to read
Markman II as an affirmation of Markman rs characterization of claim interpretation as a question of law reviewed de novo. Second, Judge Mayer asserted that "regardless of the labels we attach to these questions, without the benefit of a full record from the trial court, it is neither the function of this court nor is it within our capacity as an appellate court to adopt new interpretations" because to do so would deprive "the parties of important substantive and procedural mechanisms provided in the trial courts" and "would transform this court into a trial court of first and usually last resort.'m For Judge Rader, the virtue of Markman I was that it eliminated the jury's susceptible and capricious voice from claim interpretation and that it thereby "promised to improve the predictability and uniformity of patent law."
72 Judge Rader, however, believed that the Cybor majority by taking or affirming the additional step of characterizing claim construction as a question of law subject to de novo review "will undermine, if not destroy," the promise of Markman I and Il.
73 Thus, he turned the tables on the majority: Whereas the majority cited certainty and predictability as justifications for its holding, Judge Rader posited that the holding in Cybor was a portent of quite the opposite. 74 In support of this proposition, Judge Rader devoted a significant portion of his opinion to discussing the district court's institutional superiority with respect to claim interpretation. 75 This approach should not come as a surprise because on at least two occasions, Judge Rader has sat by designation as a district court judge in patent infringement proceedings. 76 This experience, no doubt, influenced his perspective on the proper allocation of interpretive authority concerning the issue of claim construction. Judge Rader focused on the "functional approach" of Marlanan II and asserted 69. See id. (Mayer, J., concurring) ("If it had, there would have been no need for its extensive exegesis about the Seventh Amendment and whether juries must construe claims that have evidentiary underpinnings or whether the importance of uniformity is best served by giving these evidentiary questions of meaning to a judge.").
70. Footnote stating: Rather than bluntly force the square peg of claim construction into the round hole of fact or law, the Court described the questions presented by claim construction in more chary terms .... Even a cursory reading of that opinion indicates that the Court meant to determine who should interpret the claims, without mandating a standard of appellate review to be used under all circumstances. !d. at 1464 n.l.
11 that a similar approach "might best clarify the roles of trial and appellate benches during claim interpretation.'m According to Judge Rader, a judge must "discern the meaning of the clahu terms to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention."
78 Therefore, "claim construction requires assessment of custom and usage in the relevant art" and an "assessment of the understanding of skilled artisans at the time of invention." 79 Emphasis on "custom and usage" does not mean that the extrinsic record can contradict or be inconsistent with the intrinsic record. 80 Rather, it means that testimony from a person of ordinary skill in the art should be embraced and given appropriate weight. With that in mind, consider the following:
[T]he trial judge enjoys a potentially superior position to engage in claim interpretation ... [because] [ t ]rial judges can spend hundreds of hours reading and rereading all kinds of source material, receiving tutorials on technology from leading scientists, formally questioning technical experts and testing their understanding against that of various experts, examining on site the operation of the principles of the claimed invention, and deliberating over the meaning of the claim language .... An appellate court has none of these advantages.
81
In addition, concomitant to the institutional advantages a district court judge enjoys with respect to expert testimony, there is a temporal benefit. Greater deference to the district court will lead to early certainty and resolution of claim scope, which in turn, may induce early settlement.
82 According to Judge Rader, a de novo standard of review discourages parties from settling because they are fully aware of the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will reverse the district court's claim construction. 83 [O]ne study shows that the plenary standard of review has produced reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all claim constructions since Markman I. A reversal rate in this range reverses more than the work of numerous trial courts; it also reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, this reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater certainty. Id. at 1476. These figures were based on a survey of every Federal Circuit patent decision rendered between AprilS, 1995 {the date Markman I was decided) and November 24, 1997. See id. at 1476 n.4. The total number of cases was 246, of which 141 expressly reviewed the claim interpretation of the lower tribunal (i.e., district courts, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the Court of Federal Claims). See id. Of the 141 cases, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower tribunal's claim construction, in whole or in part, "54 or 38.3%." Id. The appellate court reversed the claim interpretation of the district courts and the majority's readit1g of Markman I "means that the trial court's early claim interpretation provides no certainty at all, but only opens the bidding." 84 Also weighing in against the majority was Judge Newman. Her "additional views" bemoaned the uncertainties brought about by Markman Fs de novo review. 85 Judge Newman both endorsed the process considerations emphasized by Judge Rader and focused on the role of the artisan in claim interpretation. 86 With respect to the former, Judge Newman asserted that the majority's holding that claim interpretation does not entail fact-fmding amounted to a "fiction." 87 In fact, she posited that the entire "fact/law theory" of Markman I was an "artificial construct" that created a zero sum game that enhanced the power of the appellate judge at the expense of the trial judge. 88 Markman II, according to Judge Newman, "did not shut out the trial judge along with the jury"; 89 rather, the Supreme Court "opened the door" for the Federal Circuit to retreat from this false "fact/law" dichotomy. 90 Judge Newman proceeded to discuss the benefits of expert testimony to claim interpretation. 91 Lilce Judge Rader, she emphasized that claim meaning must be discerned by asking what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim to mean at the time the claim language was drafted. 92 Expert testimony is crucial to this determination, and the majority's constraints on the use of such testimony was an "unnecessary bar to enlightenment." 93 Judge Newman maintained that expert testimony should be considered, regardless of whether ambiguity exists: 94 Of course the primary source of information concerning the claimed invention is the patent documents. But such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional evidence and expert testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the exception. So-called "extrinsic" evidence . . . should be treated lilce any other evidence, and received and given weight and value as appropriate. 95 97 By considering extrinsic evidence before a finding of textual ambiguity, Judges Newman and Rader recognize that meaning is a "functionO not of texts but of situations in which we read them." 98 With strained reasoning, the Cybor!Markman I majority are forced to manufacture legal fictions, whether it be characterizing claim interpretation as a pure question of law, establishing an intrinsic-ambiguity requirement before expert testimony can be considered, or permitting the use of expert testimony only as an educational tool. These fictions were devised and are maintained in the name of certainty, uniformity, and predictability; ironically, however, the result has been more uncertainty. 99 Nevertheless, the formalism of Cybor and Markman I is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Thus, the question becomes: How can early certainty and uniformity be achieved within the Cybor/ Markman I framework? meaning to be given to the language, there should be no requirement that the language be ambiguous, vague, or otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken."); Michaels, supra note 50, at 30 ("For one thing, ... the decision that a text is ambiguous cannot be made prior to the introduction of extrinsic evidence.").
96. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
97. In a post-Cybor opinion, Judge Newman, in perhaps her strongest language to date, again stressed the importance of extrinsic evidence:
The panel majority, having rejected the expert testimony adduced at the trial on the ground that it is "extrinsic," excludes itself from access to this evidence and whatever scientific truth it comports. I believe it is seriously incorrect to foreclose consideration of such "extrinsic" evidence. It is increasingly recognized that courts must be enabled and encouraged to receive and understand the guidance of experts. The scientific witnesses for both sides agreed as to the uncertainties of this chemistry and the ensuing ambiguity of interpretation of the claims in light of the state of the art when the invention was made. This court's refusal to consider the evidence of experts for both sides ... is not the path to enlightenment on the complexities of polymer chemistry and technology. Judicial doubt can not be resolved by exclusion of the evidence that explains the scientific issues. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 FJd 866, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., concurring in judgment).
98. Michaels, supra note 50, at 33; see also FARNSWORTII, supra note 95, § 7.10, at 511-14; E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALELJ. 939,957-63 (1967).
99. In bemoaning the "disappointed expectations" of Markman I, Judge Newman has written that the Federal Circuit has engaged in "creative de novo claim interpretations" on appeal. According to Judge Newman, "[t]his unpredictability in administration of the law of patent claiming has added a sporting element to our bench." Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (emphasis added); see also supra note 83 (discussing thereversal rate of district court claim interpretations).
II. CONFRONTING MARKMAN ON ITS OWN TERMS
A. Interlocutory Appeals: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
The Federal Circuit has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over appeals arising from patent cases; 100 and therefore, the court has exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory orders that arise from the same. 101 Although interlocutory appeals are not granted as of right on the issue of claim interpretation, the Federal Circuit may, "in its discretion," grant such an appeal if the district court initially certifies the interlocutory order. 102 However, the Federal Circuit, without explanation, 103 has thus far refused to exercise its discretion and grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpretation.104 This reluctance may simply reflect the more general fact that interlocutory appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) are rarely granted. 105 As claim interpretation is almost invariably dispositive of validity and infringement/06 however, the court's reluctance to grant interlocutory appeals is somewhat curious given the importance of early certainty and uniformity in patent law. Moreover, an interlocutory appeal may encourage settlement 103. In declining to grant an interlocutory appeal, the court simply cites the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b ), which states that:
The granting of the appeal is also discretionary with the court of appeals which may refuse to entertain such an appeal in much the same manner that the Supreme Court today refuses to entertain applications for writs of certiorari.
It should be made clear that if application for an appeal from an interlocutory order is filed with the court of appeals. the court of appeals may deny such an application without specifying the grounds upon which such a denial is based. Although the district judge, in his discretion, must first certify the interlocutory order on claim interpretation before the Federal Circuit can entertain the appeal, 108 the problem is not district court certification. In fact, given the de novo standard of review for claim interpretation, district judges, who construe claims after a Markman hearing, appear to be more than willing to certify their claim construction for an interlocutory appeal. As Judge McMahon aptly stated in TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM:
109
(S]o final is a Markman ruling that one could make a strong case for routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), following such determinations. Given the frequency with which the Federal Circuit overrules District Court judges on issues of claim interpretation, such appeals would save millions of dollars and thousands of hours of trial time based on patent constructions that tum out to be erroneous.
110
This willingness is consistent with the three certification requirements of § 1292(b ).m For instance, certification requires that the district court judge find that the order (1) "involves a controlling question of law ((2)] as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and ( (3)] that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
112 Although "in practice the courts treat the statutory criteria as a unitary requirement"
113 to underscore the appropriateness of certifying claim interpretation for interlocutory appeal, it is helpful to look at these criteria separately.
First, claim interpretation is most likely a "controlling question of law" due to the dispositive nature of claim meaning, and an "incorrect" interpretation would most likely require a reversal of a final judgment on the issues of validity and infringement.
114 Second, the Federal Circuit's reversal rate of district court claim constructions suggests that the issue of claim interpre- [ Vol. 2001 tation usually gives rise to a "substantial difference of opinion," at least between the district court and the Federal Circuit.
115 Lastly, and closely related to the "controlling question of law" criterion, an interlocutory appeal of a claim interpretation would, more often than not, "materially advance the ultimate termination of the case," 116 particularly after a Markman hearing where the parties file briefs, present oral arguments, and construct established facts. If the Federal Circuit were to entertain an interlocutory appeal, the issues of validity and infringement would become mucli clearer, so much so that the parties may be induced to settle.
117
Of course, the district court's certification of a discretionary interlocutory appeal does not compel the Federal Circuit to hear the appeal; 118 rather, certification merely allows the petitioner to file a petition with the Federal Circuit seeking permission to hear the appeal. 119 Although the certification criteria do not apply to the Federal Circuit, one has to wonder what the court does consider when exercising its discretion. It would seem that the certification criteria, at least as a practical matter, are as applicable to the Federal Circuit as they are to the district court. Yet, as the Federal Circuit has not provided a reason for its refusal to entertain an interlocutory order on the issue of claim interpretation, one can only speculate about the reason, as Judge Schwartz did in Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. Because the courts treat the statutory criteria for discretionary appeals in a unitary manner, they look for a "controlling" question that has a potential of substantially accelerating disposition of the litigation. Thus a court will require only that the appeal present a controlling question of law on an issue whose determination may materially advance the ultimate termination of the case.
117. See Cybor Corp. v. PAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
From the patent practitioner's standpoint, this court's enthusiastic assertion of its unfettered review authority has the potential to undercut the benefits of Markman l. Markman I potentially promised to supply early certainty about the meaning of a patent claim. This certainty, in turn, would prompt early settlement of many, if not most, patent suits. Once the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can predict with some reliability the likelihood of a favorable judgment, factor in the economics of the infringement, and arrive at a settlement to save the costs of litigation. Markman I promised to provide this benefit early in the trial court process. To provide fairness under the Markman I regime, trial judges would provide claim interpretations before the expense of trial. Patent practitioners would then be armed with knowledge of the probable outcome of the litigation and could facilitate settlement. ld (footnote omitted); see also WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 110, § 3930, at 439.
All of these determinations as to what constitutes a controlling question of law, or material advancement of ultimate termination, are compatible with the conclusion that § 1292(b) is designed to permit interlocutory appeals only for the purpose of minimizing the total burdens of litigation on parties and the judicial system by accelerating or at least simplifying trial court proceedings. In Schering, Judge Schwartz noted that the "Federal Circuit disfavors direct appeals from Markman decisions," yet the court "has decided appeals from judgments that were entered based on a party's concession that it cannot succeed under the [district court's] claim interpretation.m 21 According to Judge Schwartz, perhaps the reason the Federal Circuit disfavors interlocutory review of Markman decisions is because of "the parties' intensity of preference for challenging adverse claim construction decisions." 122 Judge Schwartz continued:
[I]f a party must first consent to a final judgment of noninfringement, it will only challenge a claim construction decision when it concludes it cannot prove infringement under the claim interpretation. By denying interlocutory appeals, the Federal Circuit will only hear appeals from adverse claim construction decisions where the party concludes its case is irreparably harmed by the lower court's claim interpretation.
123
The losing party on claim interpretation, however, will most likely appeal after final judgment anyway-when district court and party resources have been expended 124 -knowing full well that de novo review awaits.
125 If the Federal Circuit grants an interlocutory appeal, the losing party, after the district court's final judgment, will be precluded, based upon law of the case, 126 from appealing the Federal Circuit's interlocutory decision. Thus, significant resources may be conserved, and the parties may be induced to settle. , 1998) ; see also Gasparo, supra note 7, at 761-62 (asserting the Mar/anan hearings "should be held before trial and coupled with a quick appellate review of the claim construction in order to circumvent any further inefficiency that may result from proceeding via a wrong construction").
125. Of course, a losing party on claim interpretation will not always appeal to the Federal Circuitthese parties may settle for a number of reasons or may simply decide not a pursue an appeal. However, in light of de novo review and the hlgh reversal rate, it is reasonable to infer that a losing party has a strong incentive to appeal. See Lee & Krug, supra note 6, at 69.
/d.
[I]t now appears that Markman has had the unintended effect of prolonging the litigation process rather than promoting settlement. The uncertainty that attaches to claim construction due to the Federal Circuit's record of reversing a large percentage of claim interpretations on appeal often leads the parties to proceed with the trial in order that the Federal Circuit may review the district court's interpretation. I am not suggesting that the Federal Circuit's caseload will not increase, 127 but it seems to me that the court has a unique obligation as the self-proclaimed arbiter of claim meaning to hear Markman orders, particularly when one considers that the benefits of hearing interlocutory orders on claim construction far outweigh the costs associated therewith. In other words, the Federal Circuit should realize that the efficiency considerations of the final judgment rule must give way to the salutary effects of interlocutory appeals. To encourage early certainty, the court has a procedural choice: the court can either employ a considerably narrower standard of review after final judgment or maintain its current de novo standard and grant an interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit cannot have it both ways. As this essay assumes, under the Cybor en bane decision, de novo review is here to stay. While I would like to think that my urging the court to entertain interlocutory appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) will have some effect, I am less than sanguine to say the least. So what should be done?
In 1988, Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee 128 to "make a complete study of the courts of the United States." 129 The Committee made the following recommendation to Congress:
To deal with difficulties arising from definitions of an appealable order, Congress should consider delegating to the Supreme Court the authority under the Rules Enabling Act to define what constitutes a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to define circumstances in which orders and actions of district courts not otherwise subject to appeal under acts of Congress may be appealed to the courts of appealsY 0 What I offer for consideration, therefore, is that pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court promulgate a rule specifically making a Markman decision appealable either (1) as of right or (2) as a matter of discretion.135
Making Markman Decisions Appealable as of Right
This proposal would permit the losing party to appeal a Markman order as of right and would be an exception to the final judgment rule in patent law. This rule holds that a decision in a patent infringement proceeding is final only upon the conclusion of an accountingP 6 The as-of-right proposal, however, is not as radical as one might initially believe. In fact, to find support for making Markman orders appealable as of right, one need not leave the procedural world of patent law or, for that matter, § 1292 of title 28. Section 1292( c )(2) creates an exception to the final judgment rule and permits a decision on patent infringement and validity to be appealed as of right before an accounting is completed. 137 The rationale for this provision, equally applicable to the issuance or denial of injunctions, 138 stresses the need to avoid the great expense associated with accountings and the loss that would result if the district court's judgment on liability were reversed. As noted by the Supreme Court:
The House Committee on Patents expressed the belief that the legislation "is needed to prevent a great burden of expense to litigants in actions to determine the validity of patents, where an accounting is involved. Under present procedure appeals may be taken from the interlocutory decree upholding the patent but not until a full accounting has been made to the court. Under this bill such appeal can be taken from such interlocutory decree ... so as to obviate the cost of an accounting in the event the case is reversed on appeal. " 139 on only one occasion exercised its authority pursuant to 1292(e) by promulgating FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f). See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f) advisory committee note.
135. Although decisions from Markman hearings are presently appealable as a matter of discretion under § 1292(b ), I am advocating a specific provision devoted exclusively to Markman decisions. The hope is that, while retaming appellate discretion, a specific provision would put greater pressure (more so than § 1292(b)) on the Federal Circuit to hear Markman appeals. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
136. See Joho Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros., 258 U.S. 82, 89 (1922) (accounting necessary for "conclusion upon the merits"); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (asserting that a decision is "not final until the conclusion of the accounting").
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (giving the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction "of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting").
138. See Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1581 n.12 ("We note than an interlocutory appeal from a permanent injunction, to the extent that it considers questions of validity and infringement .. This rationale carries as much force, if not more, when applied to interlocutory appeals of Markman orders. As noted above, interlocutory resolution of claim interpretation will materially advance the termination of litigation by clarifying the metes and bounds of the patentee's proprietary boundaries. By imbuing certainty early in the litigation process and given the dispositive nature of claim interpretation, the chances of settlement will most likely increase, thereby avoiding a costly trial on liability. Indeed, the expense associated with proving or disproving liability will most likely exceed that of an accounting.
Moreover, just like liability is fixed after judgment, claim meaning is locked-in after a Markman order-immutable for the remainder of the trial. As Judge William Young once informed litigants after a Markman ruling, "[y]ou've got the claim construction, you're going to have to live with it." 140 A patentee may of course lose on claim interpretation and win on liability, but the meaning of the claims will remain the same throughout the litigation.
This proposal may appear a bit heavy handed, but it may also prove necessary due to the Federal Circuit's reluctance to entertain interlocutory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation. The most significant problem with the as-of-right interlocutory appeal is not the change to patent litigation it would usher in ex post-that is, in fact, its strength. The problem is prompting the necessary rulemaking authorities to promulgate such a rule in the first place. The change that I suggest would require judges, who sit on the various committees empowered to enact procedural change, to limit or remove the discretion enjoyed by fellow judges. This may be asking for too much, too early. The most pragmatic approach may be a cautious one. Instead of initially pushing for as-of-right interlocutory appeals, perhaps it would be best to retain judicial discretion, while, at the same time, making it psychologically more difficult for the Federal Circuit to deny interlocutory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation.
Specifically Making Markman Decisions Appealable as a Matter of Discretion
This approach envisions a rule specifically permitting the Federal Circuit to grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpretation. Unlike the present § 1292(b ), this rule would be specifically directed towards Markman orders and thus provide the court with a tailor-made provision. I would pattern the language of such a rule on extant Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The envisioned rule would read:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may in its discretion permit an appeal from a Markman order of a district court interpreting patent claim language, if application is made within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does stay the proceedings in the district court unless the district court or Federal Circuit orders otherwise.
141
This suggestion may seem like a wishy-washy response to the problem I identified above, but a certain psychology exists to judging. Unlike the general language of § 1292(b ), the proposed rule exerts more pressure on the Federal Circuit because of the specificity of the language. The rule only applies to Markman orders and its promulgation is a direct response to the court's unwillingness to hear interlocutory appeals on claim interpretation. If the Federal Circuit persists in refusing to hear interlocutory appeals, this reluctance gives reformers firmer ground upon which to argue that the court's discretion in this regard should be limited or removed.
B. Issue Preclusion as a Means of Promoting Uniformity
Proponents of Markman I and Cybor point to the following scenario for application of de novo review. A plaintiff, who received a favorable claim construction in a prior litigation, wants to offensively estop a new and independent defendant in a subsequent litigation from asserting a different claim construction of the same claim language that was the subject of the prior litigation.
142 Because issue preclusion is unavailable here, 143 it is plausible that the two district court judges will arrive at dissimilar claim interpretations based upon their understanding of the extrinsic evidence. A more deferential standard of review, the argument goes, may lead to the affirmance of these two divergent interpretations, particularly where there is disagreement within the technological community as to the meaning of the claim language in question. Thus, in the event the subsequent district court were to reach a different claim construction than the prior district court, it would be appropriate, in the name of uniformity, for the Federal Circuit to step in and choose which of the two interpretations should prevail. This situation reflects the Federal Circuit's institutional uniqueness as the appellate patent court. · But the Federal Circuit's uniqueness is largely irrelevant in a situation where the new and independent defendant asserts issue preclusion against the patentee in a subsequent litigation. Under this scenario, the doctrine of issue preclusion fosters uniformity at the district court level. The application of issue preclusion in the context of claim interpretation is consistent [W]hereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new and independent infringement defendants even within a given jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court.
143. It is unavailable because the new and independent defendant was unable to represent his interests in the prior litigation.
with Markman II. Recall Justice Souter's language that "principles of issue preclusion ... ordinarily foster uniformity." 144 Thus, the Supreme Court envisioned that the Federal Circuit would promote uniformity in claim construction when issue preclusion is unavailable as where the patentee seeks to assert issue preclusion against a new and independent defendant.
The The disagreement centered around the "finality" of the prior judgment.152 TM strenuously asserted that the Massachusetts claim construction was not subject to collateral estoppel because the case settled during trial and Judge Young's "rulings were not sufficiently 'final' to be deemed pre- After Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the patent for the jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fullylitigated determination after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions involving the same disputed claims under the same patent. The nature of the Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.
159
The point to be made here is that when two or more district court judges hold a Markman hearing and are willing to invoke collateral estoppel, the Federal Circuit's ability to promote uniformity in claim meaning is no greater than that of a district court-even if the district court judge applying collateral estoppel does not agree with his fellow judge's prior construction.160 In fact, de novo review delays certainty, wastes trial court resources, and leads to costly appeals. Ironically, from the Markman I majority's vantage point, the characterization of claim construction as a question of law renders the determination a separate legal issue susceptible to collateral estoppel, thus enhancing the power of the district court judge.
In TM Patents, the parties in the prior Massachusetts litigation settled before the jury reached a verdict on liability so the issue of availability of appeal with respect to the court's claim interpretation was never addressed.161 In modem patent law litigation, the party who loses on claim interpretation will most likely lose on liability, and, thus, the losing party will be able to appeal the issue of claim interpretation to the Federal Circuit. What if, however, in the prior district court litigation, the patentee loses on the issue of claim interpretation, yet wins on liability (i.e., validity and infringement)? Is the patentee precluded from asserting a claim construction different from this prior construction? Based on an exception to the doctrine of issue preclusion, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Regalo Internationa~ LLC 62 said no. In many respects, the litigation history of Graco is comparable to that of the TM Patents. In Graco, the defendant, Regalo, asked the court to innecessary trial; and second, the eventual issuance of a new claim interpretation by the Federal Circuit, on appeal after final judgment, has sometimes required a second trial of the issue of infringement. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., additional views). A third consequence has been for a party, faced with an unfavorable claim construction and unwilling to endure a "meaningless trial," to request that the district court judge enter an adverse judgment against them thereby prompting an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Del. 1999). In Schering, Judge Schwartz speculated that perhaps the reason the Federal Circuit disfavors interlocutory review of Marlanan decisions without a party initially conceding that it cannot succeed under the district court's claim interpretation is because of "the parties' intensity of preference for challenging adverse claim construction decisions." ld. at377 n.2. Judge Schwartz continued:
[I)f a party must first consent to a final judgment of noninfringement, it will only challenge a claim construction decision when it concludes it cannot prove infringement under the claim interpretation. By denying interlocutory appeals, the Federal Circuit will only hear appeals from adverse claim construction decisions where the party concludes its case is irreparably harmed by the lower court's claim interpretation.
I d. However, the losing party on claim interpretation will most likely appeal after final judgment anywaywhen district court and party resources have been expended-knowing full well that de novo review awaits. If the Federal Circuit grants an interlocutory appeal, the losing party, after the district court's final judgment, will be precluded, based upon law of the case, from appealing the Federal Circuit's interlocutory decision, significant resources may be conserved, and the parties may be induced to settle. 1n a sense, a party can be said to have "lost" if it urged a broad scope of the claim, and the court upheld validity on a narrower interpretation. However, if a claim is held valid and infringed on a narrower than necessary basis, the patent owner cannot appeal ... under the first exception to issue preclusion noted in Restatement § 28 (1). !d. The first exception to issue preclusion noted in Restatement § 28(1) states that "(t]he party agaiust whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action." REsTA1EMENT(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982 For example, Judge Kelly in Graco II understandably relied upon the 1984 Federal Circuit case of Jackson Jordan for the proposition that "to apply issue preclusion to a claim interpretation issue decided in a prior infringement adjudication, 'the interpretation of the claim had to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case] on the issue of infringement. '" 174 According to Judge Kelly, because Graco lost the claim interpretation issue in the prior litigation that previous claim interpretation was "not essential to the final judgment in that case." 175 The argument that issue preclusion should be limited to issues that were essential to a judgment of validity or infringement was also made by the patentee in TM Patents. 176 In response, however, Judge McMahon boldly proclaimed that:
[ It is arguable that in the wake of Markman, the Graco II court incorrectly applied section 28(1) of the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. Comment (a) of section 28 states that section 28(1) "only applies when review is precluded as a matter of law." REsTATEI'v!ENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 28(1). If this were the only statement in comment (a), the basis for the Graco li court's decision not to invoke issue preclusion would be, given Federal Circuit precedent, unassailable on the law. However, comment (a) also notes that:
(Section 28(1)] does not apply in cases where review is available but is not sought. Nor does it apply when there is discretion in the reviewing court to grant or deny review and review is denied; such denials by a first tier appellate court are generally tantamount to a conclusion that the questions raised are without merit.
The Federal Circuit has the discretion, especially in the context of a Markman ruling, to hear claim interpretation as an interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S. C. § 1292(b) (1994) . Although the court has thus far refused to exercise this discretion, such an appeal, as discussed infra, is particularly appropriate given the "finality" of a Markman ruling. Nevertheless, this is probably asking too much of section 28(1). Although the Federal Circuit (and its sister circuits) have discretion to hear interlocutory orders under § 1292(b ), the refusal to hear an interlocutory appeal can be based on several factors having nothing to do with the merits of the appeal. Of course, what is meant by the above quoted passage remains unresolved.
173. Judge McMahon also noted that "the only reason Judge Young's conclusions were not reviewed on appeal is that the case was settled" and that a "party to who cuts off his right to review by settling a disputed matter cannot complain that the question was never reviewed on appeal. estoppel effects emanating from a jury's judgment on issues of validity and infringement to matters of claim construction that were necessarily comprehended in the verdict. That rule makes no sense when a court, acting as a matter of law, draws binding conclusions about the meaning of disputed patent terms for the benefits of the litigants and the jurors.
177
I am not suggesting that Judge Kelly acted imprudently in Graco II. There is Federal Circuit precedent and, as a district court judge, he was compelled to follow it. In fact, it would have been interesting to see what Judge McMahon would have done if she had presided in Graco II. Although, as discussed above, I believe she would have issued an opinion comparable to TM Patents. I am suggesting that the Federal Circuit should make it easier for district court judges to apply issue preclusion. As such, the court should take a close look at the TM Patents and Graco II cases and, thereafter, revisit their own precedents, particularly, Jackson Jordan and AB Dick. As a general proposition of law, it makes sense for the Federal Circuit to preclude winning parties from appealing adversely decided issues and to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. A Markman proceeding, however, is unique. As Judge McMahon aptly noted, the Markman decision "ushered in a new regime in patent claim construction.'m 8 Uniformity and certainty are the Markman mantras. Therefore, the Federal Circuit, as arbiter of ultimate claim meaning, should open its de novo doors and entertain claim interpretation appeals regardless of whether the patentee won or loss on claim interpretation at the district court. Of course, the Federal Circuit could simplify matters by granting interlocutory appeals as discussed in part II.A.
III. CONCLUSION
Most would agree that the presence of early certainty and uniformity is desirable in any patent law regime. The question this paper addresses is what procedural mechanism is best suited to facilitate the realization of early certainty and uniformity. With respect to the former, my preference would be for the Federal Circuit to exercise greater discretion when reviewing district court claim constructions, but such obeisance is unlikely. As de novo review is most likely here to stay, early certainty can only be achieved if the Federal Circuit matches its willingness to employ de novo review with an equally ardent willingness to entertain interlocutory appeals of trial court claim interpretations. With respect to promoting uniformity, the Federal Circuit has a role to play, but this role is limited to situations where the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply at the district court level. Indeed, if district court judges are inclined to apply issue preclusion in the context of claim construction, the Federal Circuit's status as the appellate 
